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Creditor rights and the market power-stability
relationship in banking
Swarnava (Sonny) Biswas1
Department of Accounting and Finance, University of Bristol
Abstract
I use the staggered passage of creditor rights reforms in 13 countries to examine
how changes in creditor rights a↵ect a) bank stability and b) the bank mar-
ket power-stability relationship. a) There is statistically weak evidence that
stronger creditor rights enhance bank stability; the result is not robust across
specifications. b) Market power positively a↵ects stability. However, there is
asymmetry in the e↵ect of market power on stability, depending on whether
there is an increase or a decrease in creditor rights. The market power-stability
relationship is stronger when a country weakens its creditor rights vis-a´-vis when
it strengthens its creditor rights.
Keywords: Bank risk-taking, Lerner index, Bank competition, Law and
Finance
JEL codes: D42, G24
1. Introduction
I analyse the market power-stability relationship in the context of the legal
setting in which the bank operates. I examine whether the e↵ect of market
power on bank risk-taking di↵ers, depending on an increase versus a decrease
in creditor rights. I find that the e↵ect of market power on bank stability is
significantly smaller when there is an increase in creditor rights, compared to
the situation when there is a decrease in creditor rights. The policy implications
are potentially large: in countries with poor creditor rights (such as the French
civil law countries), policies reducing competition could be a fruitful channel for
fostering stability in the banking sector. However, similar policies will be less
e↵ective in countries with stronger creditor rights (such as the English common
law countries).
In this paper, I explore how bank-level stability is a↵ected by changes in
creditor rights and the interaction of creditor rights and bank market power. I
115-19 Tyndalls Park Road Bristol, UK, BS8 1PQ, s.biswas@bristol.ac.uk.
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provide evidence using the staggered passage of legal reforms in 13 countries be-
tween 1995 and 2004 (treatment countries). The reforms include both increases
and decreases in creditor rights. I proxy bank stability with the Z-score, which
measures the bank’s distance to default. The proxy for bank market power is
the Lerner index, which is measured at the bank-year level. I show that the
interaction e↵ect of bank market power and creditor rights on bank stability is
negative, statistically robust and economically large.
Conceptually, one may make a strong case to study the interaction e↵ects of
market power and creditor rights on bank stability. Both higher bank market
power and creditor rights lead to higher bank profitability. I conjecture that
higher market power or creditor rights have a bigger positive impact on a bank’s
profitability, which is closer to bankruptcy than one that is already very prof-
itable and far from bankruptcy. Finally, since bank stability is increasing in
profitability (directly from the definition of Z-Score), we expect that at lower
levels of bank market power, the e↵ect of an increase in creditor rights on bank
profitability (and therefore, stability) is bigger than at higher levels of bank
market power. I call this e↵ect the substitution e↵ect.
There are two main findings:
First, I examine the e↵ect of a change in creditor rights on bank stability.
The e↵ect could go either way. Stronger creditor rights lead to higher recovery
rates in the event of borrower defaults and reduces risk. At the same time,
banks anticipate higher recovery rates and ease their lending standards, leading
to higher risk-taking. Empirically, on the one hand, I find that the stand-alone
e↵ect of stronger creditor rights is an increase in bank stability. Potentially,
banks become more stable due to an increase in recovery rates as a consequence
of higher creditor rights. However, on the other hand, an increase in creditor
rights also weakens the positive e↵ect of bank market power on stability. Overall,
I find statistically weak evidence that an increase (decrease) in creditor rights
leads to an increase (decrease) in bank stability.
Second, I test the substitution hypothesis, outlined above. I find strong
evidence in support of this hypothesis and the results survive a host of robustness
checks. Economically, the magnitude of the e↵ect is large: a one-standard
deviation increase in market power (Lerner index) is associated with a 6.9%
increase in bank stability (Z-Score) when there is an increase in creditor rights.
However, when there is a decrease in creditor rights, a one-standard deviation
increase in market power is associated with a 23% increase in the Z-Score.
Consistent with my hypothesis, I find that this result is mostly driven by bank
profitability (ROA).
Next, I introduce non-linearity into the model by augmenting the baseline
with the quadratic term for the Lerner index and its interactions with the
changes in creditor rights. I find evidence that bank stability is non-linear in
market power. Further, the results indicate that the substitution e↵ect is even
stronger at higher levels of market power.
One may be concerned regarding the potential endogeneity of the legal re-
forms passage itself. If the passage of the legal reforms are correlated with some
country-specific variables, it will bias inferences. I take several steps to address
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this issue. First, I consider a subset of the control countries, which are ex-ante,
as likely as the treatment countries to have passed legal reforms, based on ob-
servable macroeconomic variables. This subset forms a matched control group
to use as a benchmark against the treatment countries. Second, I use country-
year fixed e↵ects (a dummy for each country-year pair) in order to account for
all di↵erences (both observable and unobservable) between the treatment and
control countries. Finally, the parallel trends test shows that the pre-treatment
(before the passage of the legal reforms) di↵erences between the banks in the
treatment and control countries are purely random.
2. Related Literature
The paper is related to two principal strands of the literature: the market
power-stability literature and the law and finance literature.
There is a vast literature on the relationship between market power and bank
stability. The market power-stability view argues that market power increases
banks’ charter values and consequently, induces lower risk-taking (Keeley [25],
Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz [21], Allen and Gale [3], Matutes and Vives [30]
and Repullo [32]). On the other hand, the market power-fragility view posits
that higher market power leads to higher interest rates on loans, which induces
borrowers to take excessive risk (Boyd and De Nicolo [10]). The empirical
findings have been mixed (Claessens [11]). Macro evidence using market-level
measures of competition finds support for the market power-fragility view (e.g.,
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine [6], Schaeck, Cihak, and Wolfe [35] and Goetz
[18]). However, recent studies using cross-country data and micro-level proxies
for bank market power (e.g., the Lerner index) provide support for the market
power-stability view (see, Forssbaeck and Shehzad [17] and Beck, De Jonghe,
and Schepens [5]).
There are several theoretical (e.g., Martinez-Miera and Repullo [29] and
Gomez and Ponce [19]) and empirical (e.g. Berger, Klapper, and Turk-Ariss
[8] and Jime´nez, Lopez, and Saurina [24]) studies that look at non-linearity in
the e↵ect of market power on bank stability. Beck, De Jonghe, and Schepens
[5] show that a decrease in market power will have a larger impact on a bank’s
fragility in countries with stricter activity restrictions, more homogeneous mar-
ket structures, more generous deposit insurance and more depth in credit in-
formation sharing. Forssbaeck and Shehzad [17] and Behr, Schmidt, and Xie
[7] consider the e↵ect of regulation and supervision on the market power-risk
relationship. They find that better regulation and supervision mitigate the risk-
reducing e↵ect of higher market power. Similarly, Agoraki, Delis, and Pasiouras
[2] find that an increase in capital requirements reduces risk in general, but less
so in banks with greater market power.
This paper contributes to the literature by showing that stronger creditor
rights mitigate the risk-reducing e↵ect of higher market power. There are two
key di↵erences between my findings and extant literature: first, I explicitly con-
sider creditor rights as a channel via which market power works, which has not
been previously considered. Second, I use exogenous changes in creditor rights,
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which allows me to consider specifically the e↵ect of the change on the mar-
ket power-risk relationship, while the literature simply considers the interaction
e↵ects without indicating the direction of causality.
Parallelly, the literature on law and finance, owing to La Porta, Lopez-de
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny [27] and La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and
Vishny [26], generally concludes that stronger investor rights promote capital
market development. Esty and Megginson [16] find that syndicates are more
concentrated in countries in which creditor protection is low. Bae and Goyal [4]
analyse the e↵ect of creditor rights on loan pricing. Studies on the specific e↵ect
of stronger creditor rights on risk-taking, however, have produced contrasting
results. Acharya, Amihud, and Litov [1] find that stronger creditor rights lead
to reduced corporate risk-taking. On the other hand, Houston, Lin, Lin, and
Ma [22] find that stronger creditor rights encourage more risk-taking in banks.
My work builds on Acharya, Amihud, and Litov [1] and Houston, Lin, Lin,
and Ma [22]. I find mixed evidence that an increase (decrease) in creditor rights
reduces (increases) bank risk-taking (not robust and not always statistically
significant). My results are at odds with Houston, Lin, Lin, and Ma [22], who
find that an increase in creditor rights is associated with lower bank stability.
In contrast to the cross-sectional regressions in Houston, Lin, Lin, and Ma [22],
I use legal reforms to study the e↵ect of a change in creditor rights on bank
stability. Acharya, Amihud, and Litov [1], use a similar set-up as here (I follow
their set-up) to study corporations and find similar results as here. Some other
papers have looked at the e↵ect of legal reforms in finance. Sorge, Zhang, and
Koufopoulos [36] find that legal reforms a↵ect the debt maturity structure in
corporate firms. Haselmann, Pistor, and Vig [20] find that an increase in creditor
rights leads to an increase in the volume of lending.
In contrast to the above, I consider how creditor rights reforms a↵ect the
market power-stability relationship in banking. This interaction e↵ect has so
far been unexplored in the extant literature.
3. Hypothesis Development
3.1. Creditor Rights and Bank Stability
How does a change in creditor rights a↵ect bank risk-taking? The e↵ect
could go either way. Stronger creditor rights lead to higher recovery rates in
the event of borrower defaults and reduces bank risk. At the same time, banks
anticipate higher recovery rates and ease their lending standards, leading to
higher risk-taking.
Which of the two e↵ects dominates remains an empirical issue. The di↵erence-
in-di↵erences set-up in this paper allows a clear identification of how a change
in creditor rights a↵ects bank risk-taking.
H1a: Suppose that the e↵ect of a higher recovery rate dominates the bank’s
anticipatory e↵ects of reducing lending standards when there is an increase in
creditor rights. An increase (decrease) in creditor rights reduces (increases) bank
risk-taking.
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H1b: Suppose that the bank’s anticipatory e↵ects of reducing lending stan-
dards dominate the e↵ect of a higher recovery rate when there is an increase
in creditor rights. An increase (decrease) in creditor rights leads to an increase
(decrease) in bank risk-taking.
3.2. Substitution E↵ect
In the substitution e↵ect, I consider how changes in creditor rights a↵ect the
market power-stability relationship. In order to derive this relationship, first
note that both higher bank market power and higher creditor rights increase
bank profitability (or ROA):
The positive e↵ect of bank market power (using bank-level proxies such
as the Lerner index) on bank profits is widely empirically documented (see
Beck, De Jonghe, and Schepens [5], Forssbaeck and Shehzad [17]and Demsetz,
Saidenberg, and Strahan [14]). An increase in creditor rights has two positive
e↵ects on bank profitability. There is a direct e↵ect, which is an increase in
the recovery rate in the event that a borrower defaults. There is an indirect
e↵ect whereby the borrower default rate is reduced, e.g., Acharya, Amihud, and
Litov [1] find that an increase in creditor rights leads to a lower corporate risk
of default. Therefore, an increase in creditor rights has some positive e↵ects on
bank profitability.
Both market power and creditor rights positively a↵ect bank profitability.
I conjecture that this relationship is concave. This implies that higher market
power or creditor rights have a bigger positive impact on a bank’s profitability,
which is closer to bankruptcy than one which is already very profitable and far
from bankruptcy.
Clearly, bank stability is increasing in profitability (Z-Score is increasing
in ROA). Hence, at lower levels of bank market power, when banks are less
stable, the e↵ect of an increase in creditor rights on bank profitability (and
therefore, stability) is bigger than at the higher levels of bank market power,
when banks are more stable, e.g., a bank with low market power is less profitable,
and therefore benefits more from an increase in recovery rates (due to higher
creditor rights) than a bank with high market power and is very profitable to
start with. Hence, we expect the interaction e↵ect of bank market power and
creditor rights on bank stability to be negative. I state the null hypothesis
formally as follows:
H2: The interaction e↵ect between bank market power and creditor rights
on bank stability is negative. The two are substitutes.
4. Data
4.1. Sample
The data are compiled from several sources: Bank-level data are obtained
from the BankScope database provided by Bureau van Dijk. Djankov, McLiesh,
and Shleifer [15] provide data on legal reforms. Macroeconomic variables are
from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database of the World Bank.
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I closely follow the sample construction in Jayaraman and Thakor [23]. The
main analysis uses the legal reforms to conduct a di↵erence-in-di↵erences anal-
ysis. The treatment group comprises 13 legal reform events, in which a country
has either strengthened (7 occasions) or weakened (6 occasions) its creditor
rights. Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer [15] list 32 instances of legal reforms
over the period 1978-2004. I exclude reforms prior to 1995 (9 occasions) in
order to allow su cient observations prior to the reform event. There are 5 in-
stances in which bank-level data are not available in BankScope, and hence are
excluded. Four countries (Japan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania and Russia) have mul-
tiple reforms over the sample period. In these instances, only the most recent
reform is used and observations prior to the previous reforms are dropped.
In order to prevent duplicates, I keep information at the unconsolidated level
and drop all observations with the consolidation code, C2, in BankScope. The
reason I do this is due to the fact that the legal environment is country specific,
while consolidated accounting data are often multinational.
I form two sets of control groups - the overall sample of non-reforming coun-
tries and the matched sample of non-reforming countries that are similar to the
reforming countries. The sample of countries is from Jayaraman and Thakor
[23] (the overall control group is missing some countries from their list due to
data restrictions; the matched control group is identical to their matched control
group).
A1 (in the Appendix) presents the list of reform events. Additionally, it
includes the list of countries that comprises the two control groups. Each reform
I consider is a change in the index by 1. Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer [15]
report that Finland and Niger shift their creditor rights index by 2, but neither
country is included in my sample. The increases are from a low value of the
index (1 or 2) and the decreases are from a high value of the index (3 or 4, apart
from Sweden, which goes from 2 to 1).
4.2. Variables
Risk-Taking: The dependent variable is bank risk-taking or its distance
from insolvency. As with numerous other studies (e.g., Laeven and Levine [28],
Houston, Lin, Lin, and Ma [22], Beck, De Jonghe, and Schepens [5]), I proxy
bank insolvency risk with the Z-Score. It equals the return on assets plus the
equity-to-assets ratio, divided by the standard deviation of the return on assets:
Zi,t =
ROAi,t + (E/A)i,t
 i(ROA)
(1)
ROA is the return on assets, E/A denotes the equity-to-assets ratio and  (ROA)
is the standard deviation of ROA over the full sample period in the study (follow-
ing Forssbaeck and Shehzad [17]). For robustness, I also compute  (ROA) using
a rolling time window (following Schaeck and Cihak [34] and Beck, De Jonghe,
and Schepens [5]).
The measure, Z-Score, may be interpreted as the number of standard devi-
ations that a bank’s profits have to fall for the bank to just deplete its equity
6
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capital and become insolvent (Roy [33]). A higher Z-Score signals that a bank
has a lower insolvency risk. It is well known that the distribution of Z-Score is
highly skewed; hence, I use the natural logarithm of Z-Score in the regression
analysis.
Market Power: Following several recent studies in the competition-stability
literature (Beck, De Jonghe, and Schepens [5], Forssbaeck and Shehzad [17]),
I use the Lerner index as a proxy for bank market power. The Lerner index
captures a bank’s profits over and above its marginal cost. It is defined as:
Li,t =
Pi,t  MCi,t
Pi,t
(2)
P is the price of the bank output (ratio of total income to total assets) and
Mc is the marginal cost of the production of this output. The marginal cost
is estimated on the basis of a translog cost function with one output (total
assets) and three input prices (personnel expenses, operating costs, and interest
expenses). It is estimated following Beck, De Jonghe, and Schepens [5] and
others. The marginal cost for each bank is obtained by di↵erentiating the cost
with the bank output (total assets). A higher value of the Lerner index indicates
that the bank extracts more rents and has higher market power.
As Delis, Kokas, and Ongena [12], Delis, Kokas, and Ongena [13] and Beck,
De Jonghe, and Schepens [5] point out, there are several advantages of using
the Lerner index as a proxy for market power. First, the main reason for using
the Lerner index is a pragmatic one, as it is easily measurable at the bank-
year level. Second, it does not rely on assumptions of bank homogeneity, unlike
market concentration measures.
As a robustness check, I replace the Lerner index with the net interest
margin as a measure of bank market power. A wider margin indicates stronger
market power.
Controls: I include the usual bank-level controls used in the literature: the log
of bank assets, annual growth in assets, the level of deposits and overheads. All
bank-level controls have been winsorised at the 1% level to minimise the e↵ect
of outliers.
Turning to the country-level controls, I include the log of GDP per capita
and the growth rate in GDP. I control for the annual Inflation rate. I include a
proxy for financial market development in the form of capitalization in the stock
market as a percentage of GDP, mcap. Finally, I include the sum of exports
and imports, Trade (in logs).
4.3. Summary Statistics
[Table 1]
Panel A of Table (1) presents the bank-level summary statistics of the entire
sample. The average bank funds itself with 9% equity and 80% deposits. The
average profitability (return on assets) is 7.4%. The main bank-level variables
are the Z-Score (insolvency risk) and the Lerner index (market power). The
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average bank has a Z-Score of 2.05 and ranges from 0 (almost bankrupt) to
225.8. Similarly, there is su cient variability in the Lerner index with a mean
of .21 and ranging from -8.5 to 1. The Lerner index can be negative in the
short run, but a negative Lerner index may not be sustained in the long run;
meanwhile if the index takes a value 1, it indicates a monopoly.
In Panel B, I report the variation of the key variables (Z-Score and Lerner
index) at di↵erent levels. Similar to Beck, De Jonghe, and Schepens [5] most of
the variation in both the Z-Score and Lerner index arises between banks rather
than within banks over time. Also, similar to their observation, there is larger
variation across banks within a specific country in a given year, as opposed to
across countries.
[Table 2]
In terms of the country-level variables (Table (2)), the GDP growth rate is 3.6%
and the annual inflation rate is 7%. It can be seen from the range of GDP per
capita that the sample consists of both rich and poor countries, allowing for
heterogeneity in the cross-section.
[Table 3]
In Table (3), I report the main variables of interest by legal origin. La Porta,
Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny [27], La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer,
and Vishny [26] and Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer [15] find that the common
law countries a↵ord stronger protection to external investors (both creditors and
shareholders), compared to civil law countries. I verify this result in my dataset.
The English common law countries have the strongest creditor rights (2.64) and
the French civil law countries have the weakest (1.54), with the other civil law
countries lying in the middle. Does that give rise to systematic patterns in the
variables of interest considered in this paper?
The average Z-Score is highest in the common law countries, which suggests
that bank stability is higher when there are stronger creditor rights. The average
Z-Score is lowest in the German civil law countries and Socialist countries. The
countries belonging to the French civil law family come second in rank of the
average Z-Score, despite their reputation of having the lowest creditor rights.
There is less variation in the average Lerner index, which ranges from 0.18 to
0.24. Bank stability and market power are positively correlated in each of the
legal families, which provides suggestive evidence for the market power-stability
relationship. The substitution hypothesis predicts that the relationship should
be stronger in countries with lower creditor rights (the civil law countries).
Indeed, the average correlation is .15 in the common law countries while, almost
double at around .3 in the civil law countries. The French and German civil
law countries have similar averages, while the 3 Scandinavian countries in the
sample have much bigger average correlations.
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5. Empirical Methodology
The empirical strategy relies on legal reforms where countries either strength-
ened or weakened their creditor rights. The research setting is borrowed from
Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer [15], Acharya, Amihud, and Litov [1] and Ja-
yaraman and Thakor [23].
I use a di↵erence-in-di↵erences (DiD) set-up. The dependent variable is bank
risk-taking as proxied by the Z-Score. Post is an indicator variable that takes
a value, 1, for the years after the passage of the legal reform in the reform-
ing countries. Inc and Dec are two indicator variables that take a value of 1
for countries passing legal reforms that either strengthened or weakened their
creditor rights, respectively. All three indicator variables take a value of 0 in
non-reforming countries. The DiD e↵ect is captured by the interaction terms
Inc*Post and Dec*Post.
Does a change in creditor rights a↵ect the relationship between market power
and bank stability? The interaction terms, Inc*Post*Lerner andDec*Post*Lerner,
examine how the e↵ect of market power changes if there is an increase or de-
crease in creditor rights, respectively.
The empirical specification is set out as follows:
Zi,t =  j +  t +  1Inc ⇤ Post+  2Dec ⇤ Post+  3Lerneri,t 1+
 5Inc ⇤Post ⇤Lerneri,t 1+  6Dec ⇤Post ⇤Lerneri,t 1+↵Xi,t 1+  Cj,t+ ✏
(3)
The indices i, j, t stand respectively for bank, country and time (year). The vec-
tor of the bank-specific variables, Xijt, characterise the bank’s business model.
It contains information from the bank’s financial statements. The vector, Cjt,
contains country-specific control variables. All bank-level control variables are
lagged by one year in order to address any endogeneity concerns.
In the core specification, country ( j) and year ( t) fixed e↵ects are included.
The country fixed e↵ects absorb all time-invariant variation across countries, in-
cluding whether countries passed legal reforms. Therefore, these fixed e↵ects
subsume the coe cients on Inc and Dec. Similarly, the year fixed e↵ects absorb
the coe cient on Post. The error term in the regression may be serially corre-
lated, as the dependant variable is at the bank-country-year level, and some of
the explanatory variables are observed at the country-year level (Moulton [31]).
Therefore, errors are clustered at the country-level (same as Acharya, Amihud,
and Litov [1] and Jayaraman and Thakor [23]).
If bank market power positively a↵ects bank stability, we expect a positive
coe cient on the Lerner index,  3 > 0. If, on the other hand, market power is
detrimental for stability, we will find that  3 < 0.
The hypothesis, H1, considers the e↵ect of a change in creditor rights on
the level of bank risk-taking. The stand-alone e↵ect of an increase in creditor
rights is given by the coe cient on Inc*Post,  1 and the stand-alone e↵ect of a
decrease in creditor rights is given by the coe cient on Dec*Post,  2. However,
the overall e↵ect of a change in creditor rights will include its interaction e↵ect
9
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with market power ( 5 for an increase and  6 for a decrease in creditor rights).
Therefore, the overall e↵ect of an increase in creditor rights is the sum of the
stand-alone e↵ect of an increase in creditor rights and the interaction e↵ect via
market power ( 1 +  5 ⇤ Lerner|Inc⇤Post=1). Similarly, the overall e↵ect of a
decrease in creditor rights is captured by ( 2 +  6 ⇤ Lerner|Dec⇤Post=1). The
di↵erence between the two overall e↵ects, denoted  cr, reflects the change in
bank stability due to an increase in creditor rights, compared to the case when
there is a decrease in creditor rights:
 cr =  1    2 + ( 5 ⇤ Lerner|Inc⇤Post=1) + ( 6 ⇤ Lerner|Dec⇤Post=1) (4)
The hypothesis, H2, considers whether the e↵ect of market power on bank risk-
taking depends on creditor rights. When there are no legal reform , the overall
e↵ect of market power on risk-taking is fully captured by the coe cient on
the Lerner index,  3. However, when there is a change in creditor rights, the
overall e↵ect is the sum of the stand-alone e↵ect and the interaction via creditor
rights. Does market power a↵ect risk-taking di↵erently if the creditor rights
index increases versus if it decreases ( 5    6 6= 0)? If there is a substitution
e↵ect between market power and creditor rights, we expect that  5 < 0 and
 6 > 0. The substitution hypothesis predicts that the di↵erence should be
negative, ( 5    6 < 0).
The identification strategy relies on the assumption that the passage of the
legal reforms is exogenous and not correlated with country-specific factors. I use
the propensity score matched sample from Jayaraman and Thakor [23] to control
for observable di↵erences between the treatment and control countries. Further,
in order to control for unobservable i↵erences, I include time-varying country
fixed e↵ects (a dummy for each country-year pair). The country-year fixed
e↵ects absorb all country-level variations, including the coe cients on Inc*Post
and Dec*Post. Including the country-year fixed e↵ects implies that we exploit
only the within country-year variation and control for all time-varying country-
specific variables correlated with the passage of legal reforms. This rules out the
possibility that the results are driven by some omitted country-specific variables
(observed or unobserved).
6. Results
6.1. Baseline
Columns (1)-(4) in Table (4) present the estimation results of the di↵erence-
in-di↵erences set-up described in equation (3).
[Table 4]
In each specification, there is a positive and significant relationship between
market power and bank stability ( 3 is positive). This is consistent with a host of
theoretical models (see e.g., Keeley [25], Matutes and Vives [30], Allen and Gale
[3], Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz [21] and Repullo [32]). It is also consistent
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with the existing empirical literature, which use Lerner index as a proxy for
market power (see e.g., Forssbaeck and Shehzad [17]and Beck, De Jonghe, and
Schepens [5]). The e↵ect of market power is both statistically significant and
economically large. When there are no legal reforms, a one-standard deviation
increase in the Lerner index, which equals .15, is associated with an average
increase in the Z-Score by 15.3% (1.021*0.15).
The interaction e↵ects between a change in creditor rights and market power,
 5 and  6, are consistent with the substitution hypothesis. An increase in
creditor rights reduces the e↵ect of theLerner index on the Z-Score,  5 < 0.
Similarly, a decrease in creditor rights leads to an increase in the e↵ect of the
Lerner index on the Z-Score,  6 > 0. The coe cients have a consistent sign
in every specification. Both coe cients are statistically significant when the
matched control group is used, but only  5 is statistically significant when the
entire control group is used as the benchmark.
H2 states that there would be heterogeneity in the e↵ect of market power
on bank risk-taking, based on whether a country strengthened or weakened its
creditor rights ( 5    6 6= 0). As predicted by the substitution hypothesis,
across all specifications the di↵erence is negative and statistically significant
( 5    6 =  1.08 and t-statistic =  8.52). This result is economically very
large. A one-standard deviation increase in Lerner index is associated with an
increase in the Z-Score by 6.9% if there is an increase in creditor rights. On the
other hand, if there is a decrease in creditor rights, a one-standard deviation
increase in the Lerner index is associated with an increase in the Z-Score by
23%.
In testing H1, note that the e↵ect of a change in creditor rights is a combi-
nation of the stand-alone and interaction e↵ects. The stand-alone e↵ect of an
increase (decrease) in creditor rights is positive (negative), but is only some-
times statistically significant. However, as noted above, an increase (decrease)
in creditor rights reduces (increases) the positive e↵ect of market power on bank
stability. I find mixed evidence that bank stability increases when there is an
increase in creditor rights, compared to the case when there is a decrease in
creditor rights. Specifically,  cr (see equation (4)) is generally positive in the
baseline specifications, but not always statistically significant.
The evidence regarding the stand-alone e↵ect of a change in creditor rights
on bank stability is mixed, but points toward hypothesis, H1a, which states
that an increase (decrease) in creditor rights reduces (increases) bank risk. This
indicates that the e↵ect of a higher recovery rate due to an increase in creditor
rights dominates the e↵ect of banks lowering lending standards in anticipation
of higher recovery rates. However, an increase in creditor rights also leads to a
smaller positive e↵ect of bank market power on stability. On balance, the e↵ect
of creditor rights on stability is closer to neutral.
Next, in Specifications (5) and (6), I augment the original model with the
quadratic term for the Lerner index and its interactions with Inc*Post and
Dec*Post. The baseline results remain consistent with the substitution hypoth-
esis. Market power has a smaller e↵ect on bank stability when there is an
increase vis-a´-vis a decrease in creditor rights.
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The coe cient on the quadratic term is positive and statistically significant,
indicating that market power non-linearly a↵ects bank risk. The interaction
term of the squared Lerner index and Inc*Post (Dec*Post) is negative (posi-
tive). This indicates that the substitution e↵ect is even stronger at higher levels
of market power. According to the substitution e↵ect, when there is an in-
crease in creditor rights, the e↵ect of market power on stability is weaker. This
relationship is further weaker at higher levels of bank market power.
6.2. Robustness: Sub-samples
In this section, I consider a sub-sample analysis to test the robustness of the
key results. I report the results in Table (5). For each regression, I report the
coe cients on the key variables of interest: the e↵ect of a change in creditor
rights on bank stability,  cr and the substitution e↵ect, ( 5    6).
[Table 5]
Of the 13 reform events, countries vary in terms of the number of banks. I
systematically remove one of the treatment countries at a time in order to ensure
that the main results are not driven by banks in any single country. Next, note
that each reform corresponds to a change in one of the four components of the
creditor rights index. In order to ensure that the results are not driven by
changes in any single component of the index, I systematically remove them,
one by one.
As in the baseline (matched control group), the e↵ect of a change in creditor
rights on bank stability is not statistically significant in any of the regressions.
The result for the substitution e↵ect remains qualitatively consistent with the
baseline in each regression ( 5    6 is always negative and statistically signifi-
cant).
6.3. Curtailed Sample and Rolling Window Volatility of ROA
The staggered nature of the reforms means that the length of pre- and post-
event windows di↵er for each country in the treatment group. Specifically,
most of the decrease in creditor rights appear in the 1990s, while the increase
in creditor rights appear in the early 2000s. This is especially important to
address, as the standard deviation of ROA (which is an input for the main
dependent variable, Z-Score) is computed over di↵erent windows for banks in
di↵erent countries, which could be problematic. As a solution, I curtail the
sample by keeping only 4 pre- and post-years (t± 4) for each of the treatment
countries and re-estimate the regressions.
A second issue also pertains to computing the standard deviation of ROA.
If it is computed using the whole sample, it does not vary over time for a bank.
An alternate way to compute it is to use a rolling time window (as in Schaeck
and Cihak [34] and others). The rolling time window implies that I lose some
years of observations at the beginning of the sample.
[Table 6]
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In Table (6), I present the results. In Specifications (1) and (2), I use the
curtailed sample and the Z-Score with the standard deviation of ROA for each
bank, computed over the whole sample (same as the baseline). The results
remain consistent with the substitution hypothesis ( 5    6 =  0.864 and
t-statistic =  3.76).
In Specifications (3) and (4), I use the Z-Score using the 4-year rolling stan-
dard deviation of ROA, which reduces the sample size. The e↵ect of a decrease
in creditor rights on the market power-stability e↵ect,  6, still has a consistent
sign (positive), but is no longer statistically significant. This is possibly because
most of the decrease reforms are in the beginning of the sample (in the 90s)
and I lose a large fraction of the pre-treatment years for these reforms, due to
measuring the standard deviations on a rolling basis. Overall, the results re-
main consistent with the substitution hypothesis. The e↵ect of market power
on stability is lower when there is an increase in creditor rights versus a decrease
in creditor rights ( 5    6 =  0.888 and t-statistic =  2.15).
6.4. Components of Z-Score
In this section, I replace the dependent variable, Z-Score, with each of its
three components separately, in order to understand the driving forces behind
the substitution e↵ect. The results are reported in Table (7).
[Table 7]
The analysis of the components of the Z-Score shows that the substitution
e↵ect is mostly (although, not entirely) driven by the ROA. The e↵ect of market
power on bank profits is positive, but smaller if there is an increase in creditor
rights vis-a´-vis a decrease in creditor rights. The e↵ect is both economically
large and statistically significant ( 5    6 =  1.92 and t-statistic =  2.87).
This is consistent with the argument that the substitution e↵ect is driven by
the concavity of profitability in market power or creditor rights.
The standard deviation of ROA is positively related to risk; therefore, we
expect the opposite signs on the estimated coe cients when it is the dependent
variable. Consistent with the substitution hypothesis,  5    6 is positive, but
not statistically significant.
Finally, turning to the equity regressions, a decrease in creditor rights leads
to an increase in leverage. Additionally, the substitution e↵ect is also present
( 5    6 =  0.053 and t-statistic =  2.12).
Curiously, the e↵ect of an increase (decrease) in creditor rights is negative
(positive) on bank ROA and equity, despite the e↵ect being weakly opposite on
bank stability (Z-Score). This result is reconciled by the observation that an
increase in creditor rights negatively a↵ects the denominator of the Z-Score, the
standard deviation of ROA.
6.5. De-constructing Market Power
In this section, I test the sensitivity of bank stability with respect to di↵erent
aspects of market power and report the results in Table (8).
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[Table 8]
First, in Columns (1) and (2), I use an alternate bank-level proxy for market
power: the net interest margin. The results remain consistent with the substi-
tution hypothesis. The coe cient on the interaction between Inc*Post and the
net interest margin,  5, is negative and statistically significant. The coe cient
on the interaction between Dec*Post and the net interest margin,  6, is positive
as predicted, but is not statistically significant. The di↵erence between the two
is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level ( 5    6 =  0.077 and
t-statistic =  2.34).
Next, in Columns (3) and (4), I decompose the Lerner index into its individ-
ual components (Price, P and Marginal cost, Mc) and interact each component
with Inc*Post and Dec*Post. I estimate the following model:
Zi,t =  j +  t +  1Inc ⇤ Post+  2Dec ⇤ Post+
X
x=P,Mc

 3
xxi,t 1+
 5
xInc ⇤ Post ⇤ xi,t 1 +  6xDec ⇤ Post ⇤ xi,t 1
 
+ ↵Xi,t 1 +  Cj,t + ✏ (5)
Bank stability is positively related to Price. Consistent with the substitution
hypothesis, the relationship between Price and bank stability is weaker when
there is an increase in creditor rights, compared to the case when there is a
decrease in creditor rights ( 5
P   6P =  8.42 and t-statistic =  3.62). At the
same time, bank stability decreases when there is an increase in Marginal cost.
Again, the relationship is weaker when there is an increase in creditor rights,
compared to the case when there is a decrease in creditor rights ( 5
Mc  6Mc =
10.03 and t-statistic = 3.28). These results indicate that the substitution e↵ect
is driven by both components of market power. In other words, I find evidence
of the substitution e↵ect, regardless of whether a bank’s market power increases
due to an increase in the interest rate it can charge its borrowers (higher Price),
or due to increased e ciency and cost saving (lower Marginal cost).
6.6. Parallel Trends
In this section, I test the Parallel Trends assumption. It is important to en-
sure that prior to the passage of the reforms, there are similar time trends in the
Z-Score in both the treatment and control groups (Bertrand and Mullainathan
[9]).
First, I test whether the treatment and control countries di↵er from each
other. In order to do this, I summarise the key country-level variables of non-
reforming, positive reforming (increase in creditor rights) and negative reforming
countries. The results are reported in Table (10). The t-tests of the di↵erences
in means confirm that the reforming countries are broadly similar to the non-
reforming countries in the sample, as the di↵erences are not statistically sig-
nificant. This indicates that the observed results are not driven by di↵erences
across the sample of countries, but by di↵erences in the bank-level variables.
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[Table 10]
Next, I create an indicator variable, Post(-1), denoting the years 1 or 2 prior
to the passage of reforms and interact it with the Inc and Dec variables. The
base regression (equation (3)) is augmented by including Inc ⇤ Post( 1) and
Dec ⇤ Post( 1) and their interactions with the Lerner index. If the treatment
and control groups have similar time trends prior to the passage of the reforms,
then the coe cients on the interaction variables will be insignificant. The results
are reported in Table (11).
[Table 11]
In Specifications (1) and (2), I only include instances of increases in credi-
tor rights and the control groups. In Specifications (3) and (4), I only include
instances of decreases in creditor rights and the control groups. Indeed, I find
that both coe cients on Inc ⇤ Post( 1) and Dec ⇤ Post( 1) and their interac-
tions with the Lerner index are insignificant. This indicates that the parallel
trends assumption is satisfied and the di↵erences after the passage of reforms
between the control and the treatment groups are likely to be a direct conse-
quence of the reforms. The interaction e↵ects,  5 for the increases and  6 for
the decreases, have consistent signs. The coe cients are statistically significant
across Specifications (1)-(3).
7. Conclusion
In this paper, I explore how bank-level stability is a↵ected by changes in
creditor rights and the interaction of creditor rights and bank market power.
The analysis exploits legal reforms across 13 countries between 1995 and 2004.
The proxy for bank stability is the Z-score, which measures the bank’s distance
to default. The proxy for bank market power is the Lerner index, which is
measured at the bank-year level.
I test two key hypotheses: first, the e↵ect of a change in creditor rights on
bank risk and second, the e↵ect of a change in creditor rights on the market
power-stability relationship.
I find mixed evidence that stronger creditor rights reduce bank risk-taking
(increase in distance to default). This indicates that stronger creditor rights lead
to an increase in bank recovery rates in the event of borrower bankruptcy, which
positively a↵ects bank stability. However, an increase in creditor rights also
reduces the positive e↵ect of bank market power on stability. On balance, the
overall e↵ect of a change in creditor rights is not always statistically significant.
The key contribution of this paper relates to the substitution e↵ect. I hy-
pothesise that creditor rights and market power act as substitutes in their e↵ects
on bank risk-taking. I find strong evidence that an increase (decrease) in creditor
rights reduces (increases) the e↵ect of market power on risk-taking. The result
withstands a host of robustness checks. The policy implications are important.
I present evidence of a new source of non-linearity in the market power-stability
relationship. It is important for the regulator to consider the interaction e↵ect
of creditor rights and bank market power on bank stability.
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8. Appendix
Sample construction: List of countries
Treatment group. Reforming countries and dates of passage of legal reforms:
Bulgaria (2000, Inc), Indonesia (1998, Dec), Israel (1995, Dec), Japan (2002,
Inc), Kazakhstan (2001, Dec), Lithuania (1998, Inc), Romania (2003, Inc), Rus-
sia (2002, Inc), Spain (2004, Inc), Sweden (1995, Dec), Thailand (1999, Dec),
Ukraine (1999, Dec), Uruguay (2001, Inc)
Matched control group. These countries were ex-ante equally likely to have
legal reforms as the countries in the treatment countries, based on observable
macroeconomic variables (Private credit to GDP, the log of equity market cap
to GDP, the log of international trade, the log of GDP, the annual growth in
GDP and the annual inflation)2:
Austria, Belgium, China, Germany, Ireland, Morocco, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan,
Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Switzerland
Other countries. In addition to the matched countries, the overall control
group includes the following countries:
Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, China, Colom-
bia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Sal-
vador, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Ireland, Italy,
Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slove-
nia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, UAE, UK, Vietnam
2The matched sample is taken directly from Jayaraman and Thakor, 2014, for compara-
bility across the two studies.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics: Bank Level
mean sd min max
Panel A
Lerner 0.21 0.15 -8.54 1.00
Nim 3.39 2.17 -0.16 19.52
Z-Score(ln) 0.72 1.08 -7.16 5.42
ROA 0.74 1.03 -7.36 7.73
 (ROA) 0.50 0.60 0.00 6.10
Equity 0.09 0.07 0.00 0.96
Deposits 0.80 0.14 0.00 1.13
Asset(ln) 6.94 2.01 2.30 13.27
Asset growth 11.70 20.82 -40.43 163.58
Overhead 0.03 0.02 0.00 1.13
Panel B variation
Z-Score between bank 1.055
within bank 0.446
within country-year 0.951
between country 0.486
Lerner between bank 0.139
within bank 0.089
within country-year 0.124
between country 0.083
Observations 57974
Table 2: Summary Statistics: Country Level
mean sd min max
GDP growth 3.59 1.50 0.56 8.66
GDP per cap (ln) 8.81 1.37 6.33 10.90
Inflation 6.96 5.05 -0.13 21.58
Trade (ln) 4.25 0.45 3.24 5.55
Mcap/GDP 45.69 49.09 0.72 302.34
Observations 69
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Table 3: Summary by Legal origin This table contains the key variables of interest averaged
(equally weighted by countries) at the level of legal origin. Countries denotes the number of
countries in the sample that belongs to the corresponding legal family. Out of the 74 countries
in this table, some drop out of the regressions due to the lack of data. cr is the average value
of the creditor rights index of LLSV (1998). In countries with legal reforms, I take the time-
weighted average. Z-Score and the Lerner index are the average bank stability and market
power, respectively. Corr(Z,Lerner) is the correlation coe cient between the two.
Legal Origin Countries cr Z-Score Lerner Corr(Z, Lerner)
English 20 2.64 0.550 0.197 0.153
French 34 1.54 0.443 0.176 0.288
German 14 2.24 0.288 0.193 0.305
Scandanivian 3 2.08 0.346 0.234 0.688
Socialist 3 2.11 0.285 0.243 0.546
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Table 4: Baseline This table contains the baseline results. The dependent variable is the logarithm of Z-score. Columns (1)-(4) represent the baseline
model. In Columns (5) and (6), the baseline model is augmented by the squared Lerner index and its interactions with the DiD e↵ects. All regressions
include both bank and country level controls. All bank-level explanatory variables have been lagged by a year for endogeneity concerns.  cr captures
the overall e↵ect of an increase in creditor rights on the dependent variable, relative to a decrease in creditor rights.  5    6 reflects the substitution
e↵ect. All regressions include year and country (or country*year) fixed e↵ects and robust standard errors are clustered by country (or country*year).
t-statistics are presented in brackets.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Z-Score Z-Score Z-Score Z-Score Z-Score Z-Score
Lerner 1.021⇤⇤⇤ 1.034⇤⇤⇤ 1.359⇤⇤⇤ 1.346⇤⇤⇤ 1.323⇤⇤⇤ 1.741⇤⇤⇤
(3.85) (7.22) (4.92) (9.39) (4.41) (6.35)
Lerner2 0.157⇤⇤⇤ 0.260⇤⇤⇤
(3.29) (3.82)
Inc*Post 0.175⇤ 0.248⇤⇤⇤ 0.168 0.272⇤⇤⇤
(1.78) (2.80) (1.48) (2.87)
Dec*Post -0.131 -0.207⇤ -0.162 -0.224⇤⇤
(-1.02) (-1.81) (-1.21) (-2.00)
Inc*Post*Lerner -0.558⇤⇤ -0.589⇤⇤⇤ -0.882⇤⇤⇤ -0.883⇤⇤⇤ -0.499 -0.892⇤⇤⇤
(-2.33) (-3.51) (-3.32) (-5.21) (-1.55) (-3.02)
Dec*Post*Lerner 0.517⇤⇤ 0.571⇤⇤ 0.240 0.308 0.144 -0.210
(2.13) (2.58) (0.93) (1.37) (0.54) (-0.88)
Inc*Post*Lerner2 -0.0538 -0.154⇤⇤
(-1.05) (-2.23)
Dec*Post*Lerner2 0.801⇤⇤⇤ 0.739⇤⇤⇤
(5.26) (5.27)
 cr 0.075 0.204⇤ 0.186 0.333⇤⇤⇤
(0.61) (1.74) (1.36) (2.58)
 5    6 -1.075⇤⇤⇤ -1.160⇤⇤⇤ -1.121⇤⇤⇤ -1.191⇤⇤⇤ -0.643⇤⇤⇤ -0.681⇤⇤⇤
(-8.52) (-5.88) (-9.86) (-5.97) (-4.52) (-5.27)
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Control group Matched Matched Full sample Full Sample Matched Full Sample
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed E↵ects Country, Year Country*Year Country, Year Country*Year Country, Year Country, Year
Clustering Country Country*Year Country Country*Year Country Country
Observations 35077 35077 53731 53731 35077 53731
Adjusted R2 0.039 0.030 0.051 0.038 0.044 0.059
t statistics in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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Table 5: Robustness: Sub-sample Analysis The dependent variable is the logarithm of Z-score.
I systematically remove treatment countries, one by one. Next, I remove all reforms in any
single component of the creditor rights index, one by one. cr1 is no automatic stay on assets,
cr2 refers to whether secured creditor paid first, cr3 is whether there are restrictions on going
into reorganization, and finally, cr4 refers to whether management stays in the reorganization.
All regressions include both bank- and country-level controls. All bank-level explanatory
variables have been lagged by a year for endogeneity concerns.  cr captures the overall e↵ect
of an increase in creditor rights on the dependent variable, relative to a decrease in creditor
rights.  5    6 reflects the substitution e↵ect. All regressions include year and country
fixed e↵ects and robust standard errors are clustered by country. t-statistics are presented in
brackets.
(1) (2)
( cr) ( 5    6)
no Bulgaria 0.074 -1.091⇤⇤⇤
(0.60) (-8.85)
no Indonesia 0.092 -1.121⇤⇤⇤
(0.33) (-5.44)
no Israel 0.108 -1.060⇤⇤⇤
(0.89) (-8.41)
no Japan 0.098 -0.890⇤⇤⇤
(0.72) (-4.00)
no Kazakhstan 0.067 -1.073⇤⇤⇤
(0.52) (-8.49)
no Lithuania 0.075 -1.075⇤⇤⇤
(0.61) (-8.52)
no Romania 0.064 -1.076⇤⇤⇤
(0.53) (-8.68)
no Russia 0.097 -1.087⇤⇤⇤
(0.59) (-6.32)
no Spain -.029 -1.081⇤⇤⇤
(-0.22) (-8.53)
no Sweden 0.114 -1.167⇤⇤⇤
(0.95) (-9.52)
no Thailand 0.012 -1.022⇤⇤⇤
(0.09) (-7.85)
no Ukraine 0.063 -1.037⇤⇤⇤
(0.50) (-8.74)
no Uruguay 0.079 -1.065⇤⇤⇤
(0.64) (-8.25)
no cr1 reforms 0.099 -1.072⇤⇤⇤
(0.79) (-8.68)
no cr2 reforms 0.088 -0.924⇤⇤⇤
(0.36) (-3.07)
no cr3 reforms -0.029 -1.081⇤⇤⇤
(-0.22) (-8.52)
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no cr4 reforms 0.188 -1.189⇤⇤⇤
(.63) (-7.18)
Control group Matched Matched
Controls Yes Yes
Fixed E↵ects Country, Year Country, Year
Clustering Country Country
t statistics in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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Table 6: Curtailed Sample and Rolling Window Volatility of ROA The sample is curtailed
to keep t ± 4 for each treatment country. In Columns (1) and (2), the Z-Score measure
has been computed using the standard deviation of the ROA over the full sample period. In
Columns (3) and (4), the Z-Score measure has been computed using the 4-year rolling window
standard deviation of ROA. All regressions include both bank- and country-level controls. All
bank-level explanatory variables have been lagged by a year for endogeneity concerns.  cr
captures the overall e↵ect of an increase in creditor rights on the dependent variable, relative
to a decrease in creditor rights.  5  6 reflects the substitution e↵ect. All regressions include
year and country fixed e↵ects and robust standard errors are clustered by country. t-statistics
are presented in brackets.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Z-Score Z-Score Z-Score(roll  ) Z-Score(roll  )
Lerner 0.888⇤⇤⇤ 1.297⇤⇤⇤ 1.091⇤⇤⇤ 1.280⇤⇤⇤
(5.01) (4.97) (4.76) (7.22)
Inc*Post 0.0822 0.190⇤⇤ -0.0215 -0.0592
(1.09) (2.03) (-0.12) (-0.46)
Dec*Post -0.0627 -0.0975 -0.476 -0.563⇤
(-0.53) (-1.08) (-1.45) (-1.95)
Inc*Post*Lerner -0.403⇤⇤ -0.798⇤⇤⇤ -0.573⇤⇤ -0.759⇤⇤⇤
(-2.26) (-2.97) (-2.47) (-3.94)
Dec*Post*Lerner 0.461⇤ 0.158 0.315 0.106
(1.87) (0.56) (0.68) (0.24)
 cr -0.040 0.073 0.259 0.308
(-0.33) (0.61) (0.94) (1.26)
 5    6 -0.864⇤⇤⇤ -0.956⇤⇤⇤ -0.888⇤⇤ -0.856⇤⇤
(-3.76) (-4.79) (-2.15) (-2.13 )
Control group Matched Full Sample Matched Full Sample
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed E↵ects Country, Year Country, Year Country, Year Country, Year
Clustering Country Country Country Country
Observations 29345 47999 16308 26692
Adjusted R2 0.039 0.049 0.028 0.030
t statistics in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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Table 7: Components of Z-Score This table contains the results for each of the three components of Z-Score separately. In Columns (1) and (2), the
dependent variable is bank profitability, ROA. In Columns (3) and (4), the dependent variable is the standard deviation of ROA. In Columns (5) and
(6), the dependent variable is the bank capital ratio, Equity. All regressions include both bank- and country-level controls.  cr captures the overall
e↵ect of an increase in creditor rights on the dependent variable, relative to a decrease in creditor rights.  5    6 reflects the substitution e↵ect. All
regressions include year and country fixed e↵ects and robust standard errors are clustered by country. t-statistics are presented in brackets.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ROA ROA  (ROA)  (ROA) Equity Equity
Lerner 1.583⇤⇤⇤ 1.530⇤⇤⇤ -0.0200 -0.152⇤⇤⇤ 0.0307⇤⇤⇤ 0.0315⇤⇤⇤
(3.92) (4.91) (-0.22) (-3.67) (3.11) (3.48)
Inc*Post 0.339⇤⇤ 0.234 -0.0924 -0.113⇤⇤ -0.00437 -0.00425
(2.33) (1.40) (-1.54) (-2.22) (-0.42) (-0.47)
Dec*Post 0.486⇤⇤ 0.310 0.186 0.183⇤ 0.0396⇤⇤ 0.0380⇤⇤⇤
(2.68) (1.64) (1.43) (1.86) (2.31) (3.33)
Inc*Post*Lerner -0.914 -0.884 0.00723 0.141 -0.0141 -0.0152
(-1.48) (-1.59) (0.04) (1.01) (-0.66) (-0.80)
Dec*Post*Lerner 1.017⇤ 0.991⇤ -0.0198 0.126 0.0371 0.0409⇤
(1.74) (1.94) (-0.12) (0.93) (1.61) (1.79)
 cr -0.527⇤⇤⇤ -487⇤⇤⇤ -0.292⇤⇤⇤ -0.299⇤⇤⇤ -0.059⇤⇤⇤ -0.061⇤⇤⇤
(-3.86) (-3.52) (-2.74) (-3.31) (-5.09) (-4.88)
 5    6 -1.922⇤⇤⇤ -1.868⇤⇤⇤ 0.020 0.013 -0.053⇤⇤ -0.057⇤⇤
(-2.87) (-2.94) (0.10) (0.07) (-2.12) (-2.18)
Control group Matched Full Sample Matched Full Sample Matched Full Sample
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed E↵ects Country, Year Country, Year Country, Year Country, Year Country, Year Country, Year
Clustering Country Country Country Country Country Country
Observations 37019 57020 37232 57447 37200 57307
Adjusted R2 0.129 0.119 0.125 0.113 0.367 0.321
t statistics in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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Table 8: De-constructing Market Power This table contains the results using an alternate
measure for bank market power: the net interest margin (Columns (1) and (2)) and compo-
nents of the Lerner index (Columns (3) and (4)). The dependent variable is the logarithm
of Z-Score. All regressions include both bank- and country-level controls.  cr captures the
overall e↵ect of an increase in creditor rights on the dependent variable, relative to a decrease
in creditor rights.  5    6 reflects the substitution e↵ect. All regressions include year and
country fixed e↵ects and robust standard errors are clustered by country. t-statistics are
presented in brackets.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Z-Score Z-Score Z-Score Z-Score
Nim 0.0928⇤⇤⇤ 0.0937⇤⇤⇤
(4.22) (5.84)
Price 6.890⇤ 10.76⇤⇤⇤
(1.78) (3.98)
Marginal cost (Mc) -10.10⇤⇤ -13.21⇤⇤⇤
(-2.32) (-3.97)
Inc*Post 0.280⇤⇤⇤ 0.251⇤⇤⇤ -0.0293 0.0282
(2.96) (3.73) (-0.22) (0.37)
Dec*Post 0.0640 -0.0830 -0.262 -0.305
(0.44) (-0.56) (-0.92) (-1.38)
Inc*Post*Nim -0.0858⇤⇤⇤ -0.0833⇤⇤⇤
(-2.96) (-2.97)
Dec*Post*Nim -0.00884 -0.00891
(-0.32) (-0.38)
Inc*Post*Price -2.311 -5.975⇤
(-0.57) (-1.92)
Dec*Post*Price 6.108 2.601
(1.49) (0.81)
Inc*Post*Mc 4.728 7.906⇤⇤
(1.02) (2.00)
Dec*Post*Mc -5.299 -2.350
(-1.36) (-0.71)
 cr 0.198 0.317⇤⇤ 0.316 0.460⇤⇤
(1.28) (2.14) (1.31) (2.24)
 5    6 -0.077⇤⇤ -0.074⇤⇤
(-2.34) (-2.32)
 5p    6p -8.419⇤⇤⇤ -8.576⇤⇤⇤
(-3.62) (-3.66)
 5c    6c 10.027⇤⇤⇤ 10.256⇤⇤⇤
(3.28) (3.33)
Control group Matched Full Sample Matched Full Sample
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed E↵ects Country, Year Country, Year Country, Year Country, Year
Clustering Country Country Country Country
Observations 35845 55770 35119 53788
Adjusted R2 0.029 0.032 0.031 0.041
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t statistics in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
27
Page 28 of 31
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
Table 10: Country-level variables by Reforms: The first three columns contain the means and
standard deviations of the country-level variable by each sub-group of countries (no reform,
increases and decreases in creditor rights). In the final two columns, the di↵erences and
t-statistics are reported.
no reforms increases decreases no reforms-increases no reforms-decreases
mean mean mean di↵ (t-stat) di↵ (t-stat)
GDP growth 3.54 3.11 4.57 0.43 (0.73) -1.03 (-1.61)
(1.48) (1.462) (1.49)
GDP per cap 14,773 12,111 10,710 2662 (0.521) 4063 (0.641)
(15,329) (12,372) (14,703)
Inflation 6.53 9.97 7.54 -3.44 (-1.176) -1.01 (-0.549)
(4.72) (7.56) (4.23)
Trade 80.19 65.06 83.94 15.13 (1.196) -3.75 (-0.390)
(41.76) (30.05) (19.19)
Mcap/GDP 47.89 31.46 41.68 16.43 (1.237) 6.21 (0.460)
(52.71) (29.78) (28.21)
Observations 56 7 6
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Table 11: Parallel Trends The dependent variable is the logarithm of Z-score. In Columns (1)
and (2), the sample is restricted to countries with increases in creditor rights and the control
groups. In Columns (3) and (4), the sample is restricted to countries with decreases in creditor
rights and the control groups. All regressions include both bank- and country-level controls.
All bank-level explanatory variables have been lagged by a year for endogeneity concerns. All
regressions include year and country fixed e↵ects and robust standard errors are clustered by
country. t-statistics are presented in brackets.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Z-Score Z-Score Z-Score Z-Score
Lerner 0.894⇤⇤⇤ 1.310⇤⇤⇤ 0.872⇤⇤⇤ 1.298⇤⇤⇤
(4.83) (4.83) (4.99) (4.85)
Inc*Post 0.135 0.118
(1.15) (1.15)
Inc*Post*Lerner -0.442⇤⇤ -0.840⇤⇤⇤
(-2.77) (-3.19)
Dec*Post -0.106 -0.264⇤⇤
(-0.75) (-2.07)
Dec*Post*Lerner 0.774⇤⇤ 0.419
(2.48) (1.20)
Inc*Post(-1) -0.400 -0.422
(-1.53) (-1.62)
Inc*Post(-1)*Lerner 1.586 1.152
(1.40) (1.04)
Dec*Post(-1) 0.0308 0.0256
(0.17) (0.14)
Dec*Post(-1)*Lerner -0.329 -0.323
(-1.00) (-1.04)
Control group Matched Full Sample Matched Full Sample
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed E↵ects Country, Year Country, Year Country, Year Country, Year
Clustering Country Country Country Country
Observations 33493 52147 27058 45712
Adjusted R2 0.039 0.050 0.044 0.053
t statistics in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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